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This article examines new Chinese migration into Europe during a period of economic stagnation - more 
specifically, the movement of Zhejiangese merchants in Southeast Europe. The Zhejiangese migration 
pattern is diversifying from a predominantly petty merchant phenomenon to include the sophisticated 
operations of large-scale investors. It is therefore in the interests of host countries to foster, rather than 
restrict, this progression toward institutionalization. As such, governments should shape immigration 
and antidiscrimination policies to harness the potential of these migrants. 
 
By now, enough academic literature has amassed on Chinese migration into Europe that it is no longer 
a novel phenomenon. Scholars have examined Chinese migrants in host societies as diverse as post-World 
War I Northern and Western Europe, Communist Russia and Eastern Europe, and contemporary Central, 
Eastern, Southern, and Western Europe.
1
 From their work, we can glean two general patterns among new 
Chinese migrants across the vast majority of European countries. Comprising one group are wageworkers 
in the stronger economies of Western Europe, of whom Fujianese restaurant workers are the prime example 
(Pieke et al. 2004). Meanwhile, the weaker economies of Central Europe, Southern Europe, and Southeast 
Europe tend to see more petty merchants and traders hailing from Zhejiang province, who comprise another 
distinct group. Current literature indicates that both groups exhibit limited appetite for diversification into 
other economic sectors. The Fujianese and Zhejiangese also customarily move into a host society through 
chain migration, whereby a small number of pioneers set up in a new country and then send for relatives 
and acquaintances from their hometowns to help man the nascent businesses (Pieke 1998; Chin 2001). 
Finally, both types of new Chinese migrants are bound by a particularly strong sense of entrepreneurship. 
The desire to stake out on one’s own is so strong that shortly after their arrival in a new society, migrants 
who have saved sufficient money and experience under their employers will start their own restaurant, 
wholesale, or retail business, often in areas not greatly penetrated by existing shops, and in turn send for 
other compatriots from their hometowns to assist. 
Despite the headway that has been made on the study of Fujianese workers and Zhejiangese merchants, 
however, much still needs to be learned about how their migration patterns change over time within any 
given host country. Proprietors of Chinese shops and restaurants cannot expect to remain in the same area 
running the same business at the same margins while co-ethnic compatriots crowd into the same niche 
market. For the Zhejiangese in particular, who tend to thrive in volatility, a nation’s economy simply does 
not stagnate for so long that other market entrants are perpetually kept out while consumer demand remains 
constant. An uptick in the economy can propel domestic and institutional suppliers of cheap consumer 
goods to jump in; a severe downturn can spur drop-offs in consumer demand, as well as xenophobia and 
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tougher immigration regimes. Faced with variable competition, demand, and host society attitudes, how do 
migrants adapt? It is certainly true that Chinese migration is a transnational phenomenon (Chang 2011a; 
Nyíri 2007; Pieke et al. 2004), with supply, distribution, and labor networks which can be easily moved to 
other countries in times of crisis or excessive competition. Yet relocation will not always be the solution. 
As noted by Frank Pieke , one of the foundational scholars of the Chinese in Europe, migrants may pursue 
permanent residence for reasons as diverse as social benefits and freedom of employment (2004). Empirical 
evidence also suggests that Zhejiangese merchants are beginning to diversify into other sectors, such as 
light industry. These sectors entail far greater technical and logistical knowledge – and therefore require 
more capital and coordination among suppliers, distributors, and financiers. 
Zhejiangese migration into some developing economies is therefore at an interesting juncture where the 
volume of migration may be tapering off but the features of migration are becoming more institutional. I 
use “institutional” in the sense that the Zhejiangese are delving into activities traditionally reserved for 
large multinational corporations with ample investment capital at their disposal, and also in the sense that 
these activities are beginning to enjoy the types of governmental support traditionally reserved for Chinese 
state-owned companies. This phenomenon is doubly interesting because it coincides with a period of 
intense constriction for Europe’s economies. The instinctive impulse among lawmakers and policymakers 
toward migrants during such a period will be get-tough legislation and enforcement. Such measures often 
lead to a decline in the overall number of new migrants while complicating the lives of migrants already in 
a host country. Yet new Chinese migrants may hold the propensity to cushion the downward spiral of some 
of these economies, by spurring foreign direct investment. 
This article examines the concomitant phenomena of new Chinese migration and European policy in a 
period of economic stagnation. I focus on one subset of new Chinese migrants - Zhejiangese merchants - in 
a narrow part of Europe - namely, Southeast Europe, and particularly Serbia. In choosing the Zhejiangese, I 
aim to highlight the evolution of a group of migrants who are unexpectedly conducive to foreign direct 
investment. At the same time, the choice of Serbia serves to set the stage for Chinese migration in an 
economy that has been besieged by corruption and embargoes. Serbia is, furthermore, a state that has seen a 
large and sustained volume of Chinese migrants since the mid-1990s, as well as state at the doorstep of the 
European Union (EU) that has adopted a slew of legislations to appease the gatekeepers of EU membership. 
Thus, this article focuses neither on highly skilled workers who are part of state-backed investment projects 
nor students who would be part of the brain drain, but on semi-skilled merchants. With its lens on Serbia, 
this article does not purport to extrapolate any theories of general applicability to all of Europe, though 
there are numerous similarities among Zhejiangese in Serbia and elsewhere in Europe.
2
 
I begin this article with a primer on the evolution of the Zhejiangese migration pattern, from the 
predominance of petty merchants at its inception to the sophisticated operations of Wenzhounese investors 
today. Then I will attempt to make the case that it is in the interests of host countries to foster, rather than 
restrict, the progression of this pattern toward institutionalization. Finally, I end with a discussion on how 
governments can shape immigration and antidiscrimination policies to harness the potential of these 
migrants. 
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1. Merchant Beginnings 
Throughout the 1990s, steady waves of Chinese migrants swept through Eastern Europe, either en 
route to Western Europe as wageworkers or as entrepreneurs bent on selling cheap consumer goods in 
Eastern Europe itself.
3
 In Western Europe, the migrants usually worked in restaurants or factories. As befits 
chain migration, employment patterns tended to fall along qiaoxiang(migrant sending areas) lines (Tan 
2007, 1), so that, for instance, the Fujianese from counties around Fuzhou dominated the restaurant sector. 
The Chinese communities of Eastern Europe, by contrast, were the products of shuttle traders who had 
started out in the Russian borderlands and then moved westward, into European Russia, Hungary, Romania, 
Czech Republic, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Chang 2011a; IOM1998; Nyíri 2007, 
1998). These countries were popular destinations because the collapse of Communism opened up new 
markets for consumer goods, while strong diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) often 
meant that visa requirements were waived for Chinese entrants. A large contingent of the migrants hailed 
from the towns of Qingtian and Wenzhou in Zhejiang province, areas which specialize in entrepreneurship 
and overseas migration. The Zhejiangese saw in each of these receiving countries conditions which enabled 
them to succeed. The low barriers to entry meant that Zhejiangese merchants could set up with minimal 
capital expenditures, and the thinly patrolled borders meant that they could conduct shuttle trade - or 
resettle in neighboring countries - with ease. 
In the FRY in particular, the wars of independence and their legacy had so ravaged industry and 
infrastructure that there was little viable competition against the Chinese, who had ties to low-cost 
manufacturers back home. Further, the chaos meant that borders were badly patrolled and officials were 
willing to overlook infractions of law - if adequately bribed. This made the Yugoslav successor states 
attractive targets both for wageworkers looking to steal into Western Europe and petty traders trying to 
establish small-scale consumer goods businesses. The traders customarily run shops called kineske 
prodavnice (“Chinese shops”), which can be found throughout former Yugoslavia but are especially 
numerous in Serbia and Republika Srpska. Proprietors of kineske prodavnice were almost always 
Zhejiangese from Qingtian or Wenzhou. 
In their early years, the Qingtianese and Wenzhounese were not well received in the Yugoslav 
successor states. Their large-scale settlement during the late 1990s in the Blok 70 neighborhood of New 
Belgrade spurred resentment among many locals, leading often to skirmishes with youths in the area 
(Petrovic 2007; Chang 2011a, 167). Later, when Serbia promulgated the Law of Fiscal Registers in 2003, a 
law that required receipts for all sales transactions, corrupt tax officials were given a tool to harass kineske 
prodavnice proprietors by singling them out for enforcement or demanding bribes to avoid citation. For 
their part, the Zhejiangese displayed a remarkable disregard for local customs and laws: Chinese shops 
routinely ran afoul of the Law of Fiscal Registers, even as the rest of the country grappled with reforms in 
the hopes of gaining EU membership. (Indeed, the Law of Fiscal Registers itself was passed in an effort to 
bring Serbia’s sales and tax recordkeeping up to EU standards.) Meanwhile, in all but the smallest towns, 
where there were no co-ethnic compatriots, the Chinese avoided socializing with their Serbian neighbors, 
choosing instead to import their own foods, send their children back to China for schooling, and remit their 
earnings to the qiaoxiang. The image that emerges of the Chinese communities in Serbia, then, was of a 
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hardworking but isolated and sometimes unscrupulous group of middlemen minorities who benefited from 
the country’s instability and yet established few lasting ties with the country itself. Ironically, for a 
community that arose from globalization and transnational networks, Zhejiangese merchants were 
curiously unworldly and provincial in their outlook, preferring to replicate their entire qiaoxiang experience 
rather than to become immersed in their host country. 
Over time, however, the Zhejiangese began to organize. In 2005, the merchants of Blok 70 shut down 
their businesses for several days in protest of the Law of Fiscal Registers, which they said was 
discriminatorily enforced against them. Hence, an unaffiliated group of petty merchants, who despite 
shared qiaoxiang are fiercely competitive, organized into a powerful block which paralyzed large segments 
of the Serbian economy during their strike, including downstream retailers who procure from the kineske 
prodavnice and Roma (Gypsy) employees of kineske prodavnice. The Chinese embassy was called in to 
mediate, and eventually two sides agreed that the Law of Fiscal Registers would be laxly enforced in Blok 
70 - to give time for the merchants to adjust.
4
  
Such was the state of relations between Chinese and Serbs around 2008, aptly characterized as a state 
of grudging mutual acceptance. Zhejiangese merchants had made few inroads into the sociocultural fabric 
of Serbian society, but then again, the host society too was slow to embrace the Chinese presence. A few 
films, news articles, and educational television programming tangentially addressed the Chinese presence 
or Chinese culture, suggesting a movement from acceptance to tolerance.
5
 But for the most part, the 
merchant migrants and their hosts lived in entirely different and entirely separate social spaces, coming 
together only to effect commercial transactions. This segregation was facilitated by the economic niche 
within which the petty merchants operated - wholesale and retail sales of cheap consumer products - which 
sees virtually no domestic competition. The supply routes run from China, where merchants can cheaply 
source products, and the distribution networks in Serbia rely purely on Chinese intermediaries. The 
Zhejiangese therefore seem to be a wholly segregated, self-sufficient niche of migrant entrepreneurs who 
can set up in a transition economy with ease and minimal intrusion into the social fabric. When the 
economy or local opinion sours to the point of hostility, however, these petty merchants can easily move to 
another country, taking their supply and distribution chains with them. 
It must be conceded that Serbia is not necessarily emblematic of all of Central and Southeast Europe. 
Serbia is anomalous in a number of respects, including the breadth of damage to the political and economic 
infrastructure done by the Milošević regime. That regime and its legacy, which can best be described as a 
kleptocracy, left behind a culture of corruption permeating all levels of bureaucracy as well as an economy 
where numerous industries have been decimated.
6
 All of these factors enabled the Chinese to flourish, by 
undermining domestic competition while allowing harsh laws to be bent. Elsewhere in post-Communist 
Europe, the societies were not always so dire. Therefore, while some countries might have seen sizeable 
influxes of Chinese early on, those magnitudes were not always sustained, whether because an improved 
economy rendered cheap consumer goods out-of-step with market demand or because well-enforced 
immigration and tax laws drove down the margins for Chinese entrepreneurs. In Hungary, for example, 
shortly after experimenting with a visa-free regime, the government instituted more restrictive immigration 
measures that imposed visas requirements and imperiled extensions of residency permits (Nyíri 2007). 
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Thus, one of the largest Chinese populations in the region at that time fanned out into neighboring countries. 
In the Czech Republic, another early recipient of large influxes of Chinese, migrants also did not stay long 
either, but those who did would begin to diversify into economic sectors beyond consumer goods (Moore 
2006). Yet the unique precariousness of Serbia has enticed a sojourning culture of Zhejiangese merchants 
stay longer and in larger numbers than they have in any other central or Southeast European country. If 
characteristics about the Zhejiangese can be gleaned from anywhere, it would be from Serbia, where they 
have remained primarily engaged in petty trade, isolated from society, and disengaged from politics. 
 
2. Reincarnation as Institutional Investor 
Today’s popular understanding of Chinese movement into transition economies is not the influx of 
petty merchants but, rather, technical personnel attached to large, state-backed development projects such 
as dams or roads, or the aggressive overseas acquisitions of Chinese businesses (Roberts and Balfour 2009; 
Walt 2009). These are the ventures that draw alarm from US commentators over Chinese expansionism. 
There is a disparity, then, between these institutional investments and the forays of small-scale 
entrepreneurs such as the Zhejiangese. At first glance, these two trends appear to have nothing to do with 
one another: the colossal infrastructure and investment projects are typically supported by a nexus of 
China’s political and business elite and often have a diplomatic dimension; whereas Zhejiangese merchants 
hardly ever work in concert, other than the efforts of migration brokers who link would-be migrants from 
the qiaoxiang with employers in the niche economies of receiving countries. The entrepreneurial drive of 
the Qingtianese and Wenzhounese, it turns out, was born of centuries of exclusion from the anti-business 
Confucianism of imperial China and the command economy of Communism (Forster and Yao 1999). 
Without being able to avail themselves of aid from the state, denizens of these areas fended for themselves 
by running small businesses and emigrating to trade in distant lands. 
Such were the characteristics of the Zhejiangese in Serbia around 2008 - entrepreneurial and 
disassociated from the state. Vis-à-vis the host society, relations had stalled at grudging mutual acceptance; 
vis-à-vis each other, the merchants were co-ethnic competitors, having only come together for the narrow 
purpose of protesting the Law of Fiscal Registers. Yet the Chinese community was moving from this stasis 
to deeper economic penetration. In 2008, a consortium of Chinese investors had poured 15 million Euros 
into a large shopping complex called the Kineski Tržni Centar in New Belgrade; by the time the Kineski 
Tržni Centar opened in December of that year, it had become the largest Chinese investment in the country 
(B92 News Online 2010; SrbijaNet 2009; Politika Online 2008). The project had lined up the Chinese 
embassy, local Serbian government, and commercial organizations as allies, breaking with the formerly 
apolitical nature of the Chinese in the country. It appears, therefore, that the petty merchants in Serbia had 
become a catalyst for institutional investment. 
The same pattern of Zhejiangese pooling their capital to invest in large-scale ventures is being 
replicated across Africa, Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and even North Korea. Wenzhou merchants 
have bought or planned to buy interests in shoe manufacturers in Italy, broadcasting stations in Spain and 
the United Arab Emirates; industrial parks in Russia, the US, and Vietnam; and mines in North Korea and 
Zimbabwe (Chen 2008). While many of these enterprises stem directly from efforts out of Wenzhou, some 
of the capital is drawn from consortia or organizations of Wenzhounese merchants already in the target 
country – for example, the Wenzhou Fellow Countrymen Association in South Africa, which has over a 
thousand members. Even if the capital comes ultimately from the qiaoxiang), the transnational nature of 
Zhejiangese migrant networks is doubtlessly crucial to scouting out and acting on investment opportunities. 
Notably, these investments are spread across a diverse array of industries, from footwear, clothing, and 
leather goods (which used to be the paradigmatic industry for Wenzhounese investment) to real estate, 
commodities, construction, and high tech. These ventures are also drawing support from the Chinese 
political apparatus, as evident from the accompanying of Chinese officials on Wenzhounese trade group 
visits (Xinhua 2011). The attention of government officials is usually reserved for sizeable projects, so this 
development is remarkable, both in signaling the willingness of Zhejiangese merchants and Beijing 
political elites to work together and in revealing the size and sophistication of Zhejiangese ventures 
overseas. 
Zhejiangese delegations are also being welcomed by the political leadership in potential target 
countries. An investment the magnitude of the Kineski Tržni Centar has the propensity to create jobs, spur 
construction, and broaden tax revenues. In this climate of global recession, any tangible improvement to the 
livelihood of locals will be welcomed by the governments of host nations. It is not surprising that for the 
most part, Serbian officials have rushed to support the establishment of the Kineski Tržni Centar
7
. 
Coincidentally, the banner year of 2008 for the Kineski Tržni Centar also marked the onset of the global 
recession. Investment projects such as this can only become more frequent, as the purchasing power of a 
relatively solvent China grows while most economies of the world continue to sour. Indeed, it has been said 
that China will lead the world out of recession, the sense that its healthy growth rates will mean greater 
imports from all over the world (Strauss-kahn 2009; Wessel 2010); these injections of capital into 
struggling economies will doubtlessly be part of that effort. 
 
3. Incentivizing Chinese Investment through Policy 
Assuming that Zhejiangese merchants can serve as conduits to large-scale investment, governments in 
receiving countries can pursue policies which encourage – or at least do not unreasonably hinder – the entry 
and operation of Zhejiangese. For Serbia, this means instilling a measure of predictability to the 
enforcement of the Law of Fiscal Registers, which remains on the books and, outside of Blok 70, is still 
widely regarded among Zhejiangese merchants as being discriminately enforced against them. Allegedly, 
undercover tax officials still stake out kineske prodavnice for violations, sometimes entrapping proprietors 
by paying and then leaving before receipts can be handed out, only to return later to demand bribes. This is 
part of a greater pattern of corruption endemic to Serbian society; for the Chinese in Serbia encounter graft 
at numerous levels of bureaucracy, from the customs clearing process to tax enforcement. Yet the Law of 
Fiscal Registers is unique because it disproportionately affects one type of Chinese migrant: Zhejiangese 
petty merchants. Furthermore, while businesspeople of all nationalities within Serbia, including Serbian 
nationals themselves, are routinely shaken down by government officials, the Law of Fiscal Registers is 
said to be disparately enforced against the Chinese in a way that is close to violation of human rights norms. 
Whether selective enforcement of a facially neutral law rises to the level of discrimination is not 
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conclusively answered by the Serbia’s landmark Anti-Discrimination Act of 2009, nor by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor by European anti-discrimination law.
8
 Yet the surest way to 
reshape this law will not be to challenge it in court but to transform its enforcement through top-down 
directives, so that officials refrain from specifically targeting Chinese merchants. If this is done, it would be 
an efficient way of incentivizing longer-term settlement of Zhejiangese merchants, and hence their 
maturation into investment pools or conduits, while steering clear of the impression among locals that the 
Chinese are treated preferentially (as would be the case if Chinese had an easier time clearing customs, for 
example). 
For Europe’s weaker economies that could stand to benefit from Chinese investment, a comprehensive 
policy toward the Chinese that attempts to lure and retain small-scale merchants must remove barriers to 
business, in a way that does not stir local resentment. Prevention of the disparate enforcement of laws 
figures prominently into that effort. These measures would greatly ease the lives of Chinese migrants once 
they have arrived in a host country. But what about barriers to entering a country, in the form of 
immigration laws? Counterintuitive though it may seem, my view is that for Serbia, which borders the EU 
but is not part of it, immigration laws do not need major overhaul to attract Chinese migrants. The sizeable 
Chinese population has managed to cope with the country’s visa and registration requirements through its 
ebbs and flows for nearly two decades.
9
 In the past, Serbia was used as a springboard into the EU because 
Serbia was easy to enter for Chinese citizens and bordered countries contiguous with the EU. Even after 
Serbia phased out its visa-free regime, the Chinese continued to come and try to make a livelihood. Their 
numbers have been relatively high compared with the rest of Southeast Europe, Central Europe, and 
Eastern Europe (except Russia) but modest compared to countries with strong pull factors for immigration, 
such as the United Kingdom. Barriers to entry therefore do not have to be very stringent, though that would 
change if Serbia were to ever join the EU. 
In terms of migration pull factors, Serbia contrasts quite starkly with EU members in Northern and 
Western Europe, which draw Chinese migrants more strongly because wage differentials with sending 
areas in China are more severe. To protect their own labor pool and social resources, these countries stem 
the influx of migrants through stringent immigration laws. Nevertheless, the magnetism of these countries 
is intense, and Chinese migrants continue to devise novel schemes to sneak across the borders. Once inside, 
they may be subject to exploitation and abuse by employers and migration brokers. Concomitantly, in 
response to strict immigration policies, migrants may abuse the asylum process, through submitting false 
asylum claims so as to remain in the country (Pieke 2004). In Serbia, on the other hand, as in other 
Southeast and Central European countries where immigration laws are less drastic but the economy does 
not support a large imported labor population, the Chinese question does not implicate these immigration 
and refugee policy issues; for such issues are intimately related with labor issues, and Serbia’s Chinese 
population consists primarily of petty merchants rather than wageworkers. Bearing in mind this difference 
between merchants and wageworkers, as well as empirical and anecdotal evidence which suggests that the 
former category are more likely to catalyze institutional investment, governments who want to lure 
sojourning merchants such as the Zhejiangese should ensure that their laws and law enforcement does not 
single out these populations. 
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9
 By my estimate, there are 20 000-30000 Chinese in Serbia (Chang 2011, 149 n.2). 
As the economies of Europe worsen, however, this will become more difficult to ensure. Voting 
constituents will demand stricter policies on immigrants and refugees, who are vulnerable scapegoats. 
While the pursuit of evenhanded enforcement of nondiscriminatory laws should be uncontroversial, such 
efforts may be mooted if the entry of petty merchants is severely curtailed. The irony is that to some extent, 
it is a weakened economy which draws migrants such as the Qingtianese and Wenzhounese, so a balance 
must be struck between an economy where domestic competitors are immobilized and an economy that is 
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